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The use of poverty scoring is associated with increased outreach towards poor 
borrowers only in non-profit microfinance institutions, while in for-profit microfinance 
institutions poverty scoring is associated with increased availability of financing. 
 
 
Key points 
 
Poverty scoring allows for-profit microfinance institutions to borrow funds from social 
investors in addition to funds borrowed from the market. 
As long as these social funds do not substitute market funds used in financing poor 
micro-borrowers, the share of poor clients served increases, so does financial inclusion 
of the poor. 
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Introduction 
Microfinance is a development tool that is being accused of mission drift (Aitken, 2013; 
Bateman, 2012.). Drifting microfinance institutions (MFIs) abandon the poorest clients 
to serve less poor customers who generate relatively higher revenues for the MFIs. To 
remain faithful to its social mission, microfinance needs robust instruments for 
identifying poor people. One such solution is poverty scoring (Schreiner, 2010b.). This 
paper looks at how the technique of poverty scoring is being incorporated in the 
microfinance world. 
 
The use of poverty scoring by MFIs is a relatively new trend with possible contradictory 
implications from the viewpoint of increasing financial inclusion. If credit scoring by 
using a limited number of a credit applicant’s characteristics estimates the 
creditworthiness of the applicant, the poverty scoring technique estimates the poverty 
status of the applicant. The main purpose of poverty scoring in financing is to determine 
the suitability of an applicant from the perspective of poverty to receive well-tailored 
financial services. This technique of poverty scoring uses about a dozen of 
characteristics to help in classifying applicants as poor or not poor without measuring 
their income and wealth (Schreiner, 2010a). 
 
In general, income is an indicator of a person’s degree of poverty or prosperity. Any 
society needs to know about people living in poverty in order to provide them welfare 
and other benefits such as financial inclusion. Poverty leads to financial exclusion 
because of several reasons: financial services are too expensive for the poor (Dupas & 
Robinson, 2013; Prina, 2015); those with modest incomes are denied financial services 
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(Simpson & Buckland, 2009); and some poor people exercise self-restraint because of 
the fear and shame of possible refusal (Jennett et al., 2012). Financial exclusion 
penalizes people, thus contributing to the vicious circle of poverty. Financially excluded 
people cannot get appropriate financing for making the smallest investment: improve 
living conditions, pay for education to secure a job; or buy productive assets. It is even 
more dramatic when a working poor person, who temporarily runs out of money, has no 
overdraft facility and no possibility to borrow some money for food or medicine. 
 
Although poverty, when measured using income, is a continuous variable, it is 
commonly dichotomized using a cut-off point. Those with incomes above the cut-off 
are considered non-poor while the rest are deemed poor. Most developing countries use 
either a national poverty line – own income cut-off point – or the international extreme 
poverty line which, from October 2015, is fixed at 1.90 USD per person per day 
(Ferreira et al., 2015). These 1.90 USD are 2011 US dollars and have to be adjusted by 
inflation and corresponding purchasing power parity (PPP) when applied to different 
countries and different years. The international extreme poverty line assumes that the 
very basic daily needs of a person could be procured in 2011 with 1.90 USD or its 
equivalent in other currencies accounting for the local purchasing power parity. World 
Bank estimates that just over 900 million people were experiencing extreme poverty in 
2012 (Ferreira et al., 2015) – a consistent decline from 1.93 billion in 1981 and 1.3 
billion in 2008 (Chen & Ravallion, 2010). 
 
The measurement of poverty and identification of the poor in developing countries 
poses several problems because of the widespread existence of informal and semi-
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formal sectors (Schneider & Enste, 2000), which can both underestimate as well as 
overestimate the scale of poverty (Harriss-White, 2003). Underestimation of poverty 
can result from corrupt bureaucrats and businessmen registering property and banking 
accounts on poor nominee persons. Overestimation of poverty can result from 
entrepreneurs underreporting income in order to diminish tax liability and avoid 
drawing attention of corrupt bureaucrats. It can also result from business entities not 
formally hiring employees or reporting in the payroll only fractions of their effective 
salaries in order to reduce employer contributions (Dabla-Norris et al., 2008). Under 
conditions of overestimation of poverty, considerable proportions of the population 
qualify for social benefits, including those who are non-poor due to their reported 
incomes being small. 
 
Many families in developing economies live on remittances sent by migrant workers. 
Such remittances, if sent through informal channels or if not verifiable by tax 
authorities, do not get reported as income in spite of their important contribution to the 
family budget (Singh & Velásquez, 2013). The chances are high that such families are 
not poor by local standards, but for the state authority they qualify as poor or extremely 
poor. Such information asymmetry entitles non-poor families to claim welfare. 
 
These complexities do not imply that there is no widespread poverty and extreme 
poverty in developing countries. In fact many of those who are not currently poor are 
vulnerably to being poor due to internal or external shocks (Bhusal, 2012). 
Nevertheless, these complexities hinder the process of identification of the real poor 
who desperately need access to welfare benefits and financial inclusion. 
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Institutions involved in providing welfare benefits and financial inclusion, such as the 
MFIs, therefore need robust mechanisms to identify the real poor. The best technique to 
identify the poor would certainly be to assess each household separately using financial 
diaries such as those implemented by Collins et al., (2009) or long questionnaires to 
estimate different income sources of applicants, but this is expensive and time 
consuming. The costs of estimating poverty and identifying the poor can be reduced by 
using poverty scoring algorithms. An algorithm is built by using structured data 
resulting from an initial investment in large numbers of extensive income and wealth 
assessments. The algorithm will distill the few characteristics of households that predict 
poverty and will isolate their relative weights. In consequence, only a few specific 
questions need to be answered by applicants seeking welfare benefits and financial 
inclusion for the purpose of an institution to estimate accurately if they are poor or not. 
 
In this paper we empirically test if the use of poverty scoring by MFIs is associated with 
increased social outreach – that is provision of financial inclusion to a larger share of 
poor clients. Since microfinance services are provided by both non-profit organizations 
and for-profit businesses, we segregate the analysis for both types of organizations. We 
further test if the use of poverty scoring by MFIs is associated with lower financial cost 
that MFIs pay for borrowing funds. Such an association would indicate that social 
investors financing MFIs value the use of poverty scoring by MFIs and are, therefore, 
willing to provide them cheaper financing. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 describes the theoretical importance of 
poverty scoring for financial inclusion; section 3 describes the construction of poverty 
scoring algorithms and associated issues; section 4 provides information about the 
selected sample used to test our hypothesis; section 5 details the empirical analysis 
dealing with the aspects of financial inclusion mentioned above; section 6 examines the 
results; and section 7 concludes. 
 
Who needs poverty scoring and why? 
Using a representative sample of surveyed households, one can extrapolate the poverty 
level and income distribution in a country. But this does not identify exactly who in the 
country is poor and who is not, it only provides a general picture. This is where poverty 
scoring comes in. It can be used to identify rapidly, with a certain degree of accuracy, 
poor households which need to be targeted for welfare benefits or financial inclusion. 
 
It is in the interest of institutions that provide welfare benefits or subsidized services 
that without spending a major part of their budget on extensively surveying their 
applicants, to reach the really poor. People who are not poor by the local standards may 
often apply for welfare benefits. In conditions of information asymmetry, institutions 
that cannot verify each individual claim can use poverty scoring for screening the poor 
from the non-poor or, if exclusion is not desirable, measure the real share of poor 
beneficiaries and adjust, if necessary, the outreach strategy to target bigger shares of 
poor people. 
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Some easily observable characteristics of a household can be helpful in differentiating a 
poor family from a non-poor one without performing a full income assessment of the 
household (Schreiner, 2010b). For example, if in a village a house has walls made of 
clay instead of stone or bricks, a tin roof instead of tiled or concrete roof, one common 
room instead of many, and does not own any cattle, it seems to be good evidence of the 
household being poor. Therefore, using statistical procedures and structured data of 
such type, one can construct an algorithm which estimates the chances of a person with 
a certain profile to have revenues below an established poverty line. 
 
Based on an initial sample of responses to a questionnaire, the poverty scoring 
developer identifies the characteristics which differentiate the poor from the non-poor, 
isolating the importance of each characteristic. This individual importance is usually 
expressed with a number – the characteristic’s score. All the characteristics and their 
scores form the scorecard. Using the poverty scoring algorithm supposes checking the 
profile of a subject against the scorecard. When a subject’s characteristic matches one 
from the scorecard, the subject gets the associated score. The aggregate score is 
associated with a probability of the subject being poor. For example if the aggregate 
score of a person applying to receive subsidized services is eighty in a particular 
algorithm, it may be associated with 90 per cent chance that the applicant is poor. If the 
score was ninety-five in the same algorithm, it may be associated with 70 per cent 
(lower) chance that the applicant is poor. Dichotomization – poor or not – is made by 
applying a cut-off score. 
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It is worth mentioning that poverty scoring algorithms ca be developed using different 
techniques of multivariate statistical analysis. Not all of these techniques imply the use 
of a scorecard, but all of them should result in a probability that the subject is poor.  
 
There are costs associated with the use of poverty scoring tool as with any tool.  Some 
costs are operational, related to the implementation, use and maintenance of the scoring 
tool. Others are opportunity costs relating to some non-poor applicants being 
characterized as poor (the false positives) while others who are poor being categorized 
as non-poor (the false negatives). If no tool were to be used, there would be no 
operational costs, but there would still be such opportunity costs. 
 
Many microfinance institutions do not deny credit based on the poverty score, but 
screen non-creditworthy applicants. The use of poverty scoring allows the institutions to 
estimate the proportion of poor subjects among the applicants and loan recipients. These 
metrics, if outreach towards the poor is high in the MFI, might represent an intangible 
asset for the microfinance institution. The MFI can signal to social investors interested 
in poverty reduction to get funding from them. 
 
One other big advantage of poverty scoring is the ability to track recipients’ scores over 
time and thus measure their progress out of poverty. If the average poverty score of long 
term clients increases with time (the probability of poverty decreases), it would 
demonstrate that the average income of loan recipients increased and some are no 
longer poor or are less poor than before. An MFI may attribute this poverty reduction to 
the impact of financial inclusion it facilitated. 
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To summarize, microfinance institutions may need poverty scoring to: screen applicants 
– refuse some clients if their profiles indicate low probability of being poor; evaluate 
post-factum the percentage of poor micro-borrowers; and track the progress out of 
poverty of microloan recipients – an indicator of possible social impact. 
 
Potentialities and limitations of poverty scorecards 
Construction of poverty scoring algorithms requires statistical modelling and 
appropriate data comprising of a training sample and a test sample. The training sample 
is used to model the poverty scoring algorithm, while the test sample is used to make 
sure it works – assigns systematically high probabilities of being poor to poor subjects 
and low probabilities of being poor to non-poor subjects without previously knowing 
their incomes. 
 
Obtaining the training sample demands a lot of effort since poor and non-poor 
households have to be extensively surveyed, first to determine accurately their income, 
and second, to collect various poverty-related characteristics out of which a manageable 
number, say a dozen, can be identified for the purpose of composing the poverty scoring 
algorithms. 
 
Some MFIs might already have collected their own data needed for development of 
poverty scoring algorithms because when loan officers evaluate loan applications they 
make detailed assessment of income and expenditure of applicants. Loan application 
forms require, and thus collect, social, business and demographic information. If the 
10 
 
MFIs can get complete data about a few hundred confirmed poor loan applicants and a 
few hundred confirmed non-poor applicants and if this sample is representative of the 
population that applies for MFI’s loans, then this data can be used for statistical 
modelling. It is important to mention here that there are limitations to the use of poverty 
scoring algorithms because the availability of data does not guarantee that the 
algorithms will have sufficient discrimination power to justify their use. That is an 
unavoidable risk which any scoring technique has to bear. 
 
Governments of many developing countries systematically organize national household 
income and expenditure surveys. Data from such surveys are used for developing 
poverty scorecards (Schreiner, 2011). 
 
The choice of indicators to be included in national poverty scorecards can have social 
implications, since those classified as non-poor would not have access to welfare 
benefits. For example, in 2013 there were media reports (Puiu, 2013) about social 
tensions which led the Government of Moldova to amend the official poverty scorecard 
by excluding 3 out of 17 characteristics, which seemed unjust or unclear to different 
segments of population for the use of these characteristics for classifying households as 
poor or non-poor. These characteristics were: possession of a black and white television 
in rural area; possession of bicycle in rural area; and possession of a telephone. 
 
Martinelli & Parker (2009) found that applicants in a poverty alleviation program in 
Mexico were systematically underreporting certain household characteristics to appear 
poorer than they actually were in order to increase their chances of getting into the 
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program. It was also noted that they were reporting certain non-existent characteristics, 
such as availability of sanitation infrastructure, in order to not appear embarrassingly 
poor for social reasons. This example of contradictory behavior on the part of the poor 
in underreporting some and over-reporting other characteristics highlights the difficulty 
in constructing robust poverty scoring algorithms and their use. Therefore the 
developers of poverty scoring algorithms and their users have to be vigilant. For 
example, it may appear that observing whether a household owns a television is an easy 
task, but it may turn out to be very difficult if the householder hides the television. 
Societal changes also affect the usefulness of a scorecard for classifying households as 
poor or non-poor (Desiere et al., 2015). For example, in many developing countries the 
possession of a mobile phone a few years ago signified a well-off economic status, 
while currently the advances in telecommunication technologies, by reducing costs, 
have enabled many poor households to get access to mobile phones. Therefore each 
poverty scoring algorithm needs to evolve with social changes. 
 
Since statistical modelling is a scarce and expensive skill, several open-source 
initiatives have emerged. We can cite here the internet portals microfinance.com and 
progressoutofpoverty.org. In 2016 these combined provided free reliable poverty 
scorecards for more than 60 developing countries where extreme poverty is 
concentrated. 
 
From this discussion one would expect that: hypothesis 1 – MFIs that use poverty 
scoring show increased social outreach; and hypothesis 2 – MFIs that use poverty 
12 
 
scoring have lower financing costs than similar MFIs by attracting social investors and 
donors that provide them cheap financing. 
 
The sample 
The sample we used for our data analysis was constructed through the following stages. 
A survey conducted from 2012 to 2015 identified MFIs that use poverty scoring, 
poverty rating or do not use any poverty assessment tool. Poverty rating is defined as a 
poverty assessment tool which is not empiric but rather based on the subjective 
experience of professionals. In the survey the MFIs were asked to define the poverty 
assessment tool they use. Rater MFIs were identified and separated from the scorers. 
 
Secondary data came from progressoutofpoverty.org. The internet portal maintains a list 
of MFIs which use certified poverty scoring algorithms. The names of other MFIs that 
use poverty scoring (Grameen Foundation USA, 2014) complemented the primary data. 
The combined data contains the information about whether the MFIs were using poverty 
scoring or not at a certain point in time. 
 
We complemented this data with the concurrent financial and business indicators of 
these MFIs available on the MIX Market internet portal (Microfinance Information 
Exchange, Inc., 2016). MIX Market collects annually standardized business and 
financial information from MFIs that volunteer it. The portal provides most of the data 
in a form which is suitable for comparative analysis. We matched MFIs’ business and 
finance indicators with their status of users or non-users of poverty soring. 
 
13 
 
We complemented the database with concurrent country specific indicators to capture 
also the external environment of the MFIs (World Bank Group, 2016). We excluded 
outliers – MFIs with less than 100 and more that 1 million borrowers. The dataset 
contains 1.683 data entries, some with missing variables. We did not treat missing data. 
 
The regression models 
Hypothesis 1 – poverty scoring is associated with increased social outreach 
To test if the use of poverty scoring in MFIs is associated with increased outreach 
towards the poor, we construct a linear regression model using ordinary least squares. 
Since only MFIs that use poverty scoring can estimate the number of poor borrowers 
they serve, while non-users cannot, we use a proxy which estimates the depth of the 
outreach level towards poor borrowers. This proxy measures the average loan balance 
per borrower expressed in PPP dollars – AVGLoanPPP. We calculated this variable 
using MFIs’ average loan balance per borrower provided by MIX Market (Microfinance 
Information Exchange, Inc., 2016) and PPP conversion rates which are used for 
calculating the PPP gross domestic product of countries (World Bank Group, 2016b). 
The lower the average loan balance expressed in PPP dollars in the MFI, the poorer are 
its borrowers. This proxy is suitable for cross-country comparison. The biggest 
advantage of this proxy is that it is expressed in dollars considering each country’s 
purchasing power parity. One such dollar buys in the same year the same amount of 
goods and services in each country. 
 
A set of parameters describing MFI’s internal affairs and external environment are the 
independent variables. In order to observe the behavior of variables which measure the 
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use of poverty scoring, we construct two dummy variables for identifying the type of 
poverty assessment MFIs use. Dummy Scorer identifies MFIs that use poverty scoring 
and dummy Rater identifies MFIs that use poverty rating. Control variables concern 
legal status, region, MFI’s financial indicators and some macroeconomic indicators of 
the country. We selected the control variables based on availability and judgement.  
The regression model is applied in two iterations. The first iteration considers non-profit 
MFIs only and the second iteration considers only for-profit MFIs. Regression 
coefficients are presented in B columns and the significance of these coefficients are 
presented in Sig. columns of Table 1. For each iteration, values of R squared and 
number of degrees of freedom are presented at the bottom of the table. This structure of 
presenting the regression results is common to all regression models in this paper. 
 
The robustness of each regression model was tested using data from different time 
periods. The regression coefficients of our dummy variables maintained their sign and 
statistical significance when incorporating different control variables. In the regression 
models we chose our variables to balance a high R squared with a high number of 
degrees of freedom. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
We note that in non-profit MFIs the dummies indicating the use of poverty scoring 
Scorer and poverty rating Rater show negative statistically significant regression 
coefficients. We observe just the opposite in for-profit MFIs. The dummy Scorer shows 
a positive statistically significant regression coefficient in for-profit MFIs. We conclude, 
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without implying any causality that, non-profit MFIs which use poverty scoring reach to 
more poor borrowers. We also conclude that for-profit MFIs which use poverty scoring 
reach to wealthier borrowers. Hypothesis 1 is validated for non-profit MFIs only. In the 
case of for-profit MFIs we find a counter-intuitive observation. 
 
Other statistically significant coefficients confirm the validity of the model. For 
example: larger MFIs – high Loan portfolio in PPP dollars – serve richer borrowers; 
reaching to poorer borrowers is associated with having more employees – Personnel; 
reaching to poorer borrowers is associated with higher operating expense – Operating 
expense / Assets; reaching to poorer borrowers is associated with higher return on assets 
– ROA; Number of automated teller machines per 100,000 adults, which is a proxy for 
the development of the financial sector in the country, is associated with serving richer 
borrowers in non-profit MFIs – as financial sector develops and small overdraft 
facilities become available to all applicants, non-profit MFIs have to increase their level 
of financing to provide appropriate financial inclusion. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – poverty scoring is associated with reduced financial expense 
We expect to observe that MFIs which use poverty scoring have lower financial 
expense compared to their peers because they attract or retain social investors and 
donors. Poverty-reduction oriented financiers should be willing to supply MFIs with 
cheaper financing in exchange for MFIs attaining certain social objectives. The use of 
poverty scoring by MFIs facilitates the reinforcement of the character of MFIs as 
contributing to the achievement of such social objectives as poverty reduction. 
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We construct a second linear regression model in which Financial Expense – financial 
charges divided by the value of assets – depends on several factors, including the use of 
poverty scoring. Table 2 presents the regression results of the model. We control also 
for the social outreach level – AVGLoanPPP, noticing that good social outreach 
performance is not associated with reduced financial expense of MFIs. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
We observe that the use of poverty scoring is not associated with lower financial 
expense in both non-profit and for-profit MFIs. We can reject hypothesis 2. MFIs do not 
attract cheaper financing from social investors when using poverty scoring. The 
question remains why MFIs use poverty scoring? 
 
Resolving the paradox 
On one hand, we observed that the use of poverty scoring is associated with increased 
outreach towards poorer borrowers only in non-profit MFIs, while in for-profit MFIs we 
observed just the opposite – the use of poverty scoring is associated with better-off 
borrowers. On the other hand, MFIs that use poverty scoring do not register lower cost 
of financing. Why then MFIs use poverty scoring? Non-profit MFIs might decide on 
their own to implement poverty scoring or be influenced by their socially oriented 
stakeholders, but why for-profit MFIs use poverty scoring if they cannot lower their cost 
of financing? 
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We believe it is not about the costs MFIs pay for borrowed funds, but it is about the 
availability of funds coming from social investors. Poverty scoring allows for-profit 
MFIs to borrow funds from social investors. With poverty scoring MFIs can measure 
and possibly guarantee a certain social outcome in exchange for the funds. For-profit 
MFIs that serve a wide range of customers with diverse poverty levels will see their 
average loan size being much higher than in other non-profit MFIs that target only poor 
borrowers. Nevertheless, such MFIs can reach naturally to as many poor borrowers as 
non-profit MFIs with loans at similar interest rates. Poverty scoring allows for-profit 
MFIs to signal to social investors that the MFIs can commit to certain social objectives 
if financing is made available for them. Already being able to operate in the market by 
borrowing funds at market prices, such MFIs do not seek cheap limited funding for 
which there is strong competition. These MFIs need more funding at reasonable prices. 
 
Our database does not allow us to observe the structure of borrowed funds in MFIs. 
However, we can detect if MFIs have access to increased financing by observing the 
share of non-earning liquid assets MFIs hold. MFIs that have access to extra financing 
will be inclined to draw down funds in excess of their current needs. Excess funds will 
appear in MFIs’ accounts as non-earning liquid assets. Similarly, if social investors 
provide funding that is reserved for poor borrowers which can be identified with 
poverty scoring, these funds will be disbursed to the MFI, but will be further lent to 
poor borrowers only when the appropriate candidates will apply for loans. In the 
meantime, the reserved funds will appear in MFIs’ accounts as non-earning liquid 
assets. 
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We construct a regression model in which the dependent variable is Non-earning liquid 
assets – the value of non-earning liquid assets divided by the value of total assets. The 
regression results are presented in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 here]. 
 
Results of the regression show clearly that the use of poverty scoring by for-profit MFIs 
is associated with higher shares of non-earning liquid assets. We conclude that, 
regardless of the direction of the causality, poverty scoring is a technique and a signal 
that allows for-profit MFIs to borrow funds from social investors. In exchange for 
providing funds, social investors have the guaranty that their money will reach poor 
borrowers. 
 
Discussion and future research directions 
Our research confirms that poverty scoring is a technique and a signaling tool that 
allows for-profit MFIs to borrow funds from social investors. These funds can have for 
the borrowing MFI a marginal utility above the market prices if mainstream investors 
do not provide the MFI with enough debt. Social investors get in exchange the certainty 
that provided funds will serve the aimed poor borrowers. Any mission drift will be 
detected when measuring the poverty score of clients serviced with the funds provided 
by the social investors. 
 
Future research should focus on observing if such social funds do not substitute market 
funds that are used to finance poor borrowers. If substitution happens, the net social 
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outcome resulting from lending to poor borrowers might decrease even if MFIs increase 
borrowing from social investors. 
 
Results of the regression show that only the use of poverty rating by non-profit MFIs is 
associated with higher shares of non-earning liquid assets, while this is not true for non-
profit MFIs that use poverty scoring. Future research should investigate the reasons of 
this difference. 
 
Conclusions 
This is the first scholarly investigation into the use of poverty scoring for financial 
inclusion by MFIs. We find that non-profit MFIs that use poverty scoring reach to more 
poor borrowers than non-profit MFIs that do not use any poverty assessment technique. 
We conclude that poverty scoring is a technique and a signal that allows for-profit MFIs 
to borrow funds from social investors. As long as these funds do not substitute market 
funds that are used by for-profit MFIs to finance poor borrowers, the share of poor 
borrowers served will increase, so will increase the financial inclusion of the poor. 
 
Our findings have the following policy implication: social investors should make 
disbursal of funding to MFIs, especially for-profit MFIs, conditional on the 
implementation of poverty scoring. Poverty scoring will guarantee that funds reach poor 
borrowers. Substitution might reduce the impact of funds lent by social investors if 
these replace market funds that previously were used to finance poor borrowers. To 
avoid substitution, social investors should check that the share of poor borrowers served 
increases with the receipt of funding from social investors.  
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Table 1. Regression which models the depth of social outreach (hypothesis 1). 
Dependent variable: AVGLoanPPP non-profit MFIs for-profit MFIs 
Independent variables are: B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) -6741.21 .000 -4432.64 .324 
Scorer -638.49 .009 1650.80 .012 
Rater -884.99 .048 1184.54 .288 
Loan portfolio in PPP dollars (in 
logarithm) 
518.80 .000 407.10 .100 
Personnel -.59 .041 -1.42 .003 
Equity / Assets 10.76 .071 -15.78 .266 
Administrative expense / Assets 16.43 .573 -21.80 .821 
Financial expense / Assets -76.08 .019 -91.59 .163 
Operating expense / Assets -70.44 .000 -140.05 .004 
ROA -67.85 .000 -71.73 .067 
From Africa 798.04 .090 3241.20 .008 
From East Asia and the Pacific 321.49 .546 2086.06 .069 
From Eastern Europe and Central Asia 477.73 .439 6227.73 .000 
From Latin America and the Caribbean 914.57 .018 4944.73 .000 
From Middle East and North Africa -583.05 .304 -151.29 .936 
Is bank -874.49 .376 4693.40 .001 
Is cooperative 862.10 .009 1350.71 .539 
Is non-bank financial institution 425.14 .339 812.83 .471 
Is rural bank 493.35 .832 2810.87 .190 
Population density .81 .117 -1.26 .202 
Per capita GDP (in PPP dollars) -.01 .487 -.03 .450 
Automated teller machines (per 100,000 
adults) 
41.94 .000 6.25 .673 
degrees of freedom 493 428 
R2 .395 .355 
 
 
 
Table 2. Regression which models financial expense of MFIs (hypothesis 2). 
Dependent variable: Financial expense non-profit MFIs for-profit MFIs 
Independent variables are: B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 5.18 .002 4.65 .033 
Scorer 0.32 .285 -0.35 .400 
Rater 0.79 .148 0.13 .855 
Loan portfolio in PPP dollars (in 
logarithm) 
0.00 .998 -0.12 .305 
Equity / Assets -0.06 .000 -0.06 .000 
Deposits / Assets -.02 .029 -0.00 .762 
Administrative expense / Assets -0.28 .000 -0.49 .000 
Financial revenue / Assets 0.15 .000 0.25 .000 
ROA -0.13 .000 -0.22 .000 
From Africa -1.27 .017 -1.68 .010 
From East Asia and the Pacific -2.00 .001 1.56 .025 
From Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.19 .049 1.71 .000 
From Middle East and North Africa -0.66 .287 -0.86 .478 
From South Asia 0.37 .369 2.11 .000 
Is bank 1.72 .173 1.44 .090 
Is cooperative 0.31 .519 2.87 .036 
Is non-bank financial institution -0.64 .274 2.17 .002 
Is rural bank 1.49 .630 -0.90 .482 
AVGLoanPPP (proxy for outreach 
towards the poor) 
0.00 .321 0.00 .854 
degrees of freedom 562 427 
R2 .367 .535 
 
 
 
Table 3. Regression which models non-earning liquid assets. 
Dependent variable: Non-earning 
liquid assets 
non-profit MFIs for-profit MFIs 
Independent variables are: B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 11.27 .025 -0.89 .897 
Scorer 0.20 .823 4.99 .000 
Rater 7.55 .000 0.56 .799 
Loan portfolio in PPP dollars (in 
logarithm) 
-0.27 .320 0.32 .370 
Equity / Assets 0.01 .481 0.08 .022 
Deposits / Assets .03 .226 0.11 .000 
Financial expense / Assets -0.09 .447 0.07 .635 
Yield on gross portfolio (real) 0.07 .048 0.08 .019 
From Africa 7.64 .000 5.58 .004 
From East Asia and the Pacific 6.62 .001 0.91 .685 
From Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.17 .924 3.32 .015 
From Middle East and North Africa 1.33 .480 36.13 .000 
From South Asia 5.38 .000 7.78 .000 
Is bank 1.13 .768 0.06 .982 
Is cooperative 0.87 .543 -4.90 .216 
Is non-bank financial institution 0.64 .720 -1.75 .444 
Is rural bank 2.38 .803 0.32 .940 
degrees of freedom 584 455 
R2 .169 .294 
 
 
 
 
